AuthorBhagat, Sanjai, author
TitleFinancial crisis, corporate governance, and bank capital / Sanjai Bhagat, Boulder
ImprintCambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2017
Descript xv, 242 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm

SUMMARY

In the aftermath of the 2007-8 crisis, senior policymakers and the media have blamed excessive risk-taking undertaken by bank executives, in response to their compensation incentives, for the crisis. The inevitable follow-up to this was to introduce stronger financial regulation, in the hope that better and more ethical behaviour can be induced. Despite the honourable intentions of regulation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, it is clear that many big banks are still deemed too big to fail. This book argues that by restructuring executive incentive programmes to include only restricted stock and restricted stock options with very long vesting periods, and financing banks with considerably more equity, the potential of future financial crises can be minimized. It will be of great value to corporate executives, corporate board members, institutional investors and economic policymakers, as well as graduate and undergraduate students studying finance, economics and law


SUBJECT

  1. Banks and banking -- United States
  2. Bankers -- Salaries
  3. etc. -- United States
  4. Bank capital -- United States
  5. Corporate governance -- United States
  6. Finance -- Government policy -- United States
  7. Financial crises -- United States

LOCATIONCALL#STATUS
Chula Business School Library331.2 B575F 2017 CHECK SHELVES