Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2001
Descript
223 pages ; 23 cm
SUMMARY
"Philosophers and logicians have long debated how best to understand conditional or hypothetical sentences. William G. Lycan has a distinctive approach to this debate, attending not just to the semantics of such sentences, but equally to their syntax. He shows how insights from linguistic theory help to illuminate problems about the meaning and function of conditionals." "Real Conditionals gives a presentation of this approach to a topic at the intersection of philosophy, logic, and linguistics."--BOOK JACKET
CONTENT
The syntax of conditional sentences -- Truth conditions: the event theory -- Truth conditions: reality and modus ponens -- In defense of truth value -- A beautiful but false theory of 'even if' -- An unbeautiful but less easily refutable theory of 'even if' -- The 'indicative'/'subjunctive' distinction -- The riverboat puzzle -- Appendix: 'Nonconditional conditionals' (with Michael L. Geis) -- Revisionary postscript on non-conditional conditionals
