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TitleVoting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain [electronic resource] : An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes / by Dan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi
ImprintCham : Springer International Publishing : Imprint: Springer, 2019
Edition 1st ed. 2019
Connect tohttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8
Descript X, 92 p. online resource

SUMMARY

This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of voting procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes


CONTENT

Introduction -- 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain? -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- Summary


Welfare economics Elections Political science -- Philosophy Economic theory Democracy Social Choice/Welfare Economics/Public Choice/Political Economy. http://scigraph.springernature.com/things/product-market-codes/W31020 Electoral Politics. http://scigraph.springernature.com/things/product-market-codes/911070 Political Philosophy. http://scigraph.springernature.com/things/product-market-codes/E37000 Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. http://scigraph.springernature.com/things/product-market-codes/W29000 Democracy. http://scigraph.springernature.com/things/product-market-codes/911050



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