The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these isยญ sues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially reduces the problem to the sole principal's (the sole Stackelberg leader's) optimization problem subject to the agents' (the Stackelberg followers') reยญ sponses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic setups characterized by different relationships among decision-makers. A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete inยญ formation. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more imporยญ tantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies. See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formulaยญ tion of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous deterยญ mination of updated information structures); Ichiishi and Radner (1997) and Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) for studies of a specific model of Chandler's firm in multidivisional form for sharper results; and Vohra (1999) for a recent work. It is a common postulate in these works that every player takes part in design of a mechanism and also in execution of the signed contract
CONTENT
Research Articles -- Turnpike theorems for positive multivalued stochastic operators -- Functional differential inclusion on closed sets in Banach spaces -- Job matching: a multi-principal, multi-agent model -- Term structure and SPDE -- Fixed point theorems and the existence of economic equilibria based on conditions for local directions of mappings -- Efficiency of stochastic transfers in a directed graph -- Allocations of labour resources on trajectories for the model with discrete innovations
