Author	Brinck, Ingar. author
Title	The Indexical 'I' [electronic resource] : The First Person in Thought and Language / by Ingar Brinck
Imprint	Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 1997
Connect to	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8871-3
Descript	XII, 179 p. online resource

The subject of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question concerns what we mean when we say 'J'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'J', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I' -thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in cognition. The purpose is to give a picture of how we think and talk about ourselves in a wide range of circumstances. The topic has been discussed in numerous articles during the last decades, but rarely in the form of a monograph. I felt the need for a book of this kind while working on my dissertation. The manuscript is the result of many years of reflection on the self and indexicals. Some of the theories that I advance have developed as a result of my teaching an undergraduate course in the philosophy of language the last couple of years

1. Introduction -- 1.1 The topic -- 1.2 'I' -- 1.3 Why 'I' cannot be replaced by another indexical -- 1.4 The content -- 2. 'I' Does Not Refer -- 2.1 The non-referential thesis -- 2.2 Wittgenstein on 'I' -- 2.3 Anscombe's argument -- 2.4 Immunity to error through misidentification -- 2.5 The basis of the immunity -- 3. 'I' Refers Directly -- 3.1 The minimal thesis -- 3.2 Direct reference -- 3.3 The semantic theory of direct reference -- 3.4 Direct reference and rigid designation -- 3.5 Rigid designation and essentialism -- 3.6 Objections to the semantic theory of direct reference -- 3.7 Perry on belief and meaning -- 3.8 Direct reference, presemantics, and pragmatics -- 3.9 Attitudes de se -- 3.10 Acquaintance and direct reference -- 4. 'I' Refers Indirectly -- 4.1 Indirect reference and definite descriptions -- 4.2 Frege on 'I' -- 4.3 Does the individual concept conflict with publicness? -- 4.4 Making sense of Frege: concepts and causes -- 4.5 Making sense of Frege: the individual concept -- 5. Indexicality and Non-Conceptual Content -- 5.1 The basis of de re senses: non-conceptual content -- 5.2 Identification-free knowledge and its foundation -- 5.3 Non-conceptual content and IEM -- 5.4 Can content be non-conceptual? -- 5.5 The cognitive role of de re senses -- 6. Context-Independence -- 6.1 Speakers and persons -- 6.2 Transcending the context -- 6.3 Identity over time -- 6.4 A view from nowhere? -- 6.5 Understanding 'I': conclusion -- References

1. Philosophy
2. Epistemology
3. Ontology
4. Language and languages -- Philosophy
5. Philosophy of mind
6. Philosophy
7. Philosophy of Language
8. Philosophy of Mind
9. Ontology
10. Epistemology