Author	Hopkins, Burt C. author
Title	Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger [electronic resource] : The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology / by Burt C. Hopkins
Imprint	Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 1993
Connect to	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5
Descript	XV, 303 p. online resource

ยง 1. Remarks on the Current Status of the Problematic. The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger's "devastating" phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of "fundamental ontology" in Being and Time, has almost been universallyl received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl's original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger's lectures from the period surrounding his composition of Being and Time, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl's phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, "offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,"2 will, if 3 the conclusions reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger's phenomenological /I superiority" over Husserl. This is not to suggest that the tendency toward Heidegger partisanยญ ship in the literature treating the relationship of his phenomenology to Husserl's has its basis in extra-philosophical or extra-phenomeยญ nological concerns and considerations. Rather, it is to draw attention to the undeniable 'fact' that Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's phenomenology has cast a "spell" over all subsequent discussions of the basic problems and issues involved in what has become known as their "controversy

One Husserlโ{128}{153}s Phenomenological Account of Intentionality -- One: Husserlโ{128}{153}s Phenomenological Method -- Two: The Intentionality of Logical Significance and Material Ontological Meaning -- Three: The intentionality of Psychologically Pure Consciousness -- Four: The Intentionality of Transcendentally Pure Consciousness -- Two Heideggerโ{128}{153}s Phenomenological Account of Intentionality -- Five: Heideggerโ{128}{153}s Concept of Phenomenology -- Six: The Phenomenological Inquiry into the Being of Intentionality -- Seven: Being in the World Manifests Daseinโ{128}{153}s Original Transcendence -- Eight: The Temporal Meaning of Transcendence -- Three The Confrontation of Husserlโ{128}{153}s and Heideggerโ{128}{153}s Accounts of Intentionality -- Nine: The Phenomenological Method: Reflective or Hermeneutical? -- Ten: Intentionality: An Original or Derived Phenomenon? -- Four Discussion of the Conclusions -- Eleven: Gadamerโ{128}{153}s Assessment of the Controversy between Husserl and Heidegger -- Twelve: Ricoeurโ{128}{153}s Attempted Rapprochement Between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics -- Thirteen: Mohantyโ{128}{153}s Account of the Complementarity of Descriptive and Interpretive Phenomenology -- Fourteen: Crowellโ{128}{153}s Account of Husserlโ{128}{153}s and Heideggerโ{128}{153}s Divergent Interpretations of Phenomenologyโ{128}{153}s Transcendental Character -- Fifteen: Landgrebeโ{128}{153}s Critique of Husserlโ{128}{153}s Theory of Phenomenological Reflection -- Table of Abbreviations -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography