Franz Brentano 1 was an important philosopher, but for a long time his importance was under-estimated. At least in the English speaking countries, he came to be remembered best as the initiator of a philosoยญ phical position which he in fact abandoned for good and sufficient 2 reasons. His ultimate and most important contributions passed almost unnoticed. Even such a well-informed and well-prepared book as Passmore's IOO Years 01 Philosophy (Duckworth, 1957), is open to the same comment; Passmore concentrated his attention on the early Brentano, because he regarded his influence on the British philoยญ sophical scene as being confined to Brentano's early work. Brentano's pupils, e. g. , Husserl, Meinong, Marty and Twardowski, were often influential and, often enough, they departed from the strict commonยญ sense and advisedly cautious attitude of their great teacher. Thus even on the continent, the public image of Brentano tended to be incomplete (and sometimes distorted), outside the narrower circle of pupils, followers, and people with special interest. This, or very nearly this, was still the case in 1955, when my contacts with the followers of Twardowski made me turn towards the study of Brentano. Since then there has been a gratifying revival of interest in his work. His early book on Aristotle was reprinted in German and two of his main positions, Psychologie and Wahrheit und Evidenz, are appearing in English translations. Translations into other languages, e. g
CONTENT
I. Introduction to Franz Brentano's Philosophy -- 1. Problems of Interpretation -- 2. General -- II. The Early Position -- 1. About the concept of truth. Early criticism of the correspondence theory -- 2. Arguments for the Existence of entia rationis -- III. The Transition -- 1. Analysis of Linguistic Function -- 2. Arguments against the Existence of entia rationis -- IV. The Transition and Background -- 1. Mental Acts -- 2. Judgements -- 3. An attempt to retain the correspondence theory without entia rationis -- V. Late position (critical part) -- 1. Criticism of the correspondence formula res -- 2. Criticism of the correspondence formula intellectus and adequatio -- VI. Late position (positive part) -- 1. Truth -- 2. Evidence -- VII. Ramifications of the analysis of truth -- 1. Self-evident judgements, โ{128}{152}a priori' and โ{128}{152}a posteriori' -- 2. The relation between self-evident and demonstrable knowledge -- Concluding Remarks -- Appendices
