Title | Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective [electronic resource] / edited by Charles K. Rowley |
---|---|
Imprint | Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 1997 |
Connect to | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5728-5 |
Descript | V, 324 p. online resource |
Introduction: The relevance of public choice for constitutional political economy -- Positive constitutional economics: A survey -- Constitutions for new democracies: Reflections of turmoil or agents of stability? -- Toward a new constitution for a future country -- The balanced budget amendment: Clarifying the arguments -- The prohibition-repeal amendments: A natural experiment in interest group influence -- Term limits and electoral competitiveness: Evidence from Californiaโs state legislative races -- Choosing free trade without amending the U.S. Constitution -- Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation -- On the (relative) unimportance of a balanced budget -- Public choice in a federal system -- Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective -- Subsidiarity and ecologically based taxation: A European constitutional perspective -- Rule and policy spaces and economic progress: Lessons for Third World countries