Author	Dilworth, Craig. author
Title	Scientific Progress [electronic resource] : A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories / by Craig Dilworth
Imprint	Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 1994
Edition	Third Edition
Connect to	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0914-7
Descript	IV, 252 p. online resource

Featuring the Gestalt Model and the Perspectivist conception of science, this book is unique in its non-relativistic development of the idea that successive scientific theories are logically incommensurable. This edition includes four new appendices in which the central ideas of the book are applied to subatomic physics, the distinction between laws and theories, the relation between absolute and relative conceptions of space, and the environmental issue of sustainable development

1. The Deductive Model -- 2. The Basis of the Logical Empiricist Conception of Science -- 3. The Basis of the Popperian Conception of Science -- 4. The Logical Empiricist Conception of Scientific Progress -- 5. The Popperian Conception of Scientific Progress -- 6. Popper, Lakatos, and the Transcendence of the Deductive Model -- 7. Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Incommensurability -- 8. The Gestalt Model -- 9. The Perspectivist Conception of Science -- 10. Development of the Perspectivist Conception in the Context of the Kinetic Theory of Gases -- 11. The Set-Theoretic Conception of Science -- 12. Application of the Perspectivist Conception to the Views of Newton, Kepler, and Galileo -- Appendices -- I. On Theoretical Terms -- 1. The Logical Empiricist Notion of Theoretical Term -- 2. Carnap and โ{128}{152}The Methodological Character of Theoretical Conceptsโ{128}{153} -- 3.โ{128}{153} Putnamโ{128}{153}s Challengeโ{128}{153} -- 4. Sneedโ{128}{153}s Notion of Theoretical Term -- 5. Measurement and the Empirical Basis of Science -- 6. On the โ{128}{152}Theory-Ladennessโ{128}{153}of all Scientific Concepts -- 7. Campbell, โ{128}{152}Hypothetical Ideasโ{128}{153} and the Importance of Analogy -- 8. Source vs. Subject of a Model -- 9. Models and Theoretical Terms -- 10. On the Empirical and Theoretical Aspects of Science -- II. The Gestalt Model of Scientific Progress -- III. Paradigm Change and Subatomic Physics -- 1. Thomas Kuhnโ{128}{153}s Notion of a Paradigm -- 2. Paradigms as Conceptual Perspectives -- 3. Applied Nclear Models as Conceptual Perspectives -- 4. The Distinction Between Laws and Theories -- 5. Implications for Subatomic Physics -- IV. On the Nature of Scientific Laws and Theories -- 1. Theories Are Not Simply Laws Referring to Unobservables -- 2. Theories Provide Explanations -- 3. Theoretical Explanations Are Causal -- 4. Empirical Laws, Not Individual Phenomena, Receive Explanations in Science -- 5. Theories Provide Understanding; Laws Provide Knowledge -- 6. Empirical Laws and Measurement -- 7. Laws Are Discovered; Theories Are Created -- 8. Campbellโ{128}{153}s Concept of Analogy -- 9. Models vs. Analogues -- 10. Theoretical Models Are Idealized Abstractions from Their Sources -- 11. Theoretical Ontologies and Causal Mechanisms -- 12. The Nominal vs. the Real Aspect of the Domain of a Theory -- V. Is the Transition from Absolute to Relative Space a Shift of Conceptual Perspective? -- VI. Two Perspectives on Sustainable Development -- 1. The Intended Domain of Application -- 2. Simultaneity and Shift of Perspective -- 3. Perspectival Incompatibility -- 4. Empirical Categories and Operations -- 5. Relative Acceptability -- References