Author | Dilworth, Craig. author |
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Title | Scientific Progress [electronic resource] : A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories / by Craig Dilworth |
Imprint | Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands : Imprint: Springer, 1994 |
Edition | Third Edition |
Connect to | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-0914-7 |
Descript | IV, 252 p. online resource |
1. The Deductive Model -- 2. The Basis of the Logical Empiricist Conception of Science -- 3. The Basis of the Popperian Conception of Science -- 4. The Logical Empiricist Conception of Scientific Progress -- 5. The Popperian Conception of Scientific Progress -- 6. Popper, Lakatos, and the Transcendence of the Deductive Model -- 7. Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Incommensurability -- 8. The Gestalt Model -- 9. The Perspectivist Conception of Science -- 10. Development of the Perspectivist Conception in the Context of the Kinetic Theory of Gases -- 11. The Set-Theoretic Conception of Science -- 12. Application of the Perspectivist Conception to the Views of Newton, Kepler, and Galileo -- Appendices -- I. On Theoretical Terms -- 1. The Logical Empiricist Notion of Theoretical Term -- 2. Carnap and โThe Methodological Character of Theoretical Conceptsโ -- 3.โ Putnamโs Challengeโ -- 4. Sneedโs Notion of Theoretical Term -- 5. Measurement and the Empirical Basis of Science -- 6. On the โTheory-Ladennessโof all Scientific Concepts -- 7. Campbell, โHypothetical Ideasโ and the Importance of Analogy -- 8. Source vs. Subject of a Model -- 9. Models and Theoretical Terms -- 10. On the Empirical and Theoretical Aspects of Science -- II. The Gestalt Model of Scientific Progress -- III. Paradigm Change and Subatomic Physics -- 1. Thomas Kuhnโs Notion of a Paradigm -- 2. Paradigms as Conceptual Perspectives -- 3. Applied Nclear Models as Conceptual Perspectives -- 4. The Distinction Between Laws and Theories -- 5. Implications for Subatomic Physics -- IV. On the Nature of Scientific Laws and Theories -- 1. Theories Are Not Simply Laws Referring to Unobservables -- 2. Theories Provide Explanations -- 3. Theoretical Explanations Are Causal -- 4. Empirical Laws, Not Individual Phenomena, Receive Explanations in Science -- 5. Theories Provide Understanding; Laws Provide Knowledge -- 6. Empirical Laws and Measurement -- 7. Laws Are Discovered; Theories Are Created -- 8. Campbellโs Concept of Analogy -- 9. Models vs. Analogues -- 10. Theoretical Models Are Idealized Abstractions from Their Sources -- 11. Theoretical Ontologies and Causal Mechanisms -- 12. The Nominal vs. the Real Aspect of the Domain of a Theory -- V. Is the Transition from Absolute to Relative Space a Shift of Conceptual Perspective? -- VI. Two Perspectives on Sustainable Development -- 1. The Intended Domain of Application -- 2. Simultaneity and Shift of Perspective -- 3. Perspectival Incompatibility -- 4. Empirical Categories and Operations -- 5. Relative Acceptability -- References