I. Confirming Answers to Moral Questions -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Right and the Good According to Lewis -- 3. Evaluative Sentences Analyzed -- 4. Ambiguities in Moral Questions -- II. Toward an Approach to Ethical Justification -- 5. Lewisโ{128}{153} Approach to Ethical Justification -- 6. Rationality as More Than Consistency -- 7. An Initial Look at Another Approach -- 8. What is Intrinsically Good and Why: The Outline of an Argument -- 9. Justification and Morality Enforcement -- III. The Fundamental Imperative of Rationality -- 10. Absolute, Objective, and Subjective Rationality -- 11. The Ideal Observer Standpoint -- 12. Rationality Where Probabilities Differ -- 13. The Rationale -- 14. Rationality, Prudential Goodness, and an Alleged Paradox -- IV. The Maximum Social Goodness Imperative -- 15. The Golden Rule -- 16. โ{128}{156}Social Goodnessโ{128}{157} Defined -- 17. What Counts as an Act -- 18. The General Use -- 19. The General Use as Morally Fundamental -- V. The Ideal Observer Moral Code -- 20. The Ideal Observer Criterion -- 21. The Need for Simplicity, Ease of Application, and Uniformity -- 22. Exceptions to the Rules -- 23. Borderline Cases -- 24. Conflicting Rules -- 25. A Comparison with Classical Utilitarianism -- 26. A Comparison with the โ{128}{156}Ideal Moral Codeโ{128}{157} Criterion -- VI. The Plausibility of Justification -- 27. A Foreword on Justice -- 28. The Ideal Observer Moral Code vs. a Discriminatory Moral Code -- 29. Final Formulation of the Approach to Justification -- 30. Conclusion -- Works Referred To