This research aims to analyze political conflict in Thailand from 1997-2010 within the economic frameworks of rent seeking and rent protection. The results show that both economic and political changes such as economic crisis and the establishment of the new constitution in 1997 had an impact on the transfer of political and economic power. In particular, the changes lead to a transfer of Economic rent from the old interest group to the Shinawatra interest group and its network. As a result, Economic rent accumulated by the Shinawatra’s interest group becomes significantly higher than that accumulated by other interest groups. Moreover, there is a negative correlation between the inequality of Economic rent distribution and the political stability. Driven by these facts, this research interprets monopoly rent seeking of the Shinawatra’s interest group as a main reason that lead to worsen political situation and coup in 19 September 2006.
After the coup on 19 September 2006, both people who gain from the populism policy [redistributive rent] and who are anti-military intervention marched against the government. This can be identified as a vertical rent seeking conflict between people who lost their rent from the coup and the government which was intervened by the military. The conflicts became more complicated and involve new issues of conflict such as an ideological conflict. The results lead to 2 major policy recommendations. First, setting system of rent seeking control. Especially for monopoly rent seeking behavior which could cause a high conflict between economic and political groups. Second, Promoting Schumpeterian rent. This solution will create and support economic groups whose profit comes from the non-government’s authority. If firms do not seek rent from the government’s authority, they have no incentive to compete against each other.
