In this thesis, I propose another look at the process of belief revision that happened during the transition period of paradigm change. First of all, I consider the commensurability thesis, which forms the core of Isaac Levi's notion of individual belief revision. Change of belief according to Levi can be considered in two ways : continuity and translatability along the process of inquiry. These ways, however, are denied by Thomas Kuhn, through his famous incommensurability thesis. I use the concept of 'meme', or conceptual replicators, first coined by Richard Dawkins, to consider the relation between the subjective experience of individual belief change and the phenomenon of paradigm change according to Kuhn. Then, I propose that one cannot deny discontinuity in the inquiry process in transition period, even though Kuhn has talked about the limitation of language leading to failure of translation and communication. One can nonetheless find in that discontinuity a way to carry on conversations between belief states in different paradigms, as suggested by Douglas Hofstadter's notion of conception transportation, which sees translation as a creative process. This means that Kuhn's worry about untranslability might not be an obstruction to an inquiry process.
