Social organization and mechanism design: proceedings of the Second Francqui Colloquium, 10-11 June 1996, Brussels / Claude d Aspremont (ed.)
Imprint
Bruxelles : DeBoeck Universite, 1999
Descript
344 p. ; 26 cm
CONTENT
Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities -- Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games -- Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges -- Dynamic Incentive Constrained Problems: the Lagrange Multipliers Approach -- Social Learning in Recurring Games -- Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm -- Contracts and Productive Information Gathering -- Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency -- Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Access Costs: Budget Balance versus Efficiency -- Interim Efficiency in a Public Goods Problem -- Unique Implementation in Auctions and in Public Goods Problems -- Model of Efficient Discovery -- Economic Dynasties with Intermissions