โครงสร้างองค์กรการบริหารงานบุคคลของข้าราชการอัยการในประเทศไทย / สมชาย เก้านพรัตน์ = The structure of personnel administration of Thai public prosecutors / Somchai Kao-nopparutne
Public prosecution, as one of the most important mechanism in the administration of criminal justice, has to saveguard public interest in criminal procedure as well as to protect freedom of the people. It is therefore necessary that the public prosecution organization be independent from undue interference. The study has shown that until 1935, the public prosecution was under total control of the executive. The Minister of Interior could directly involve in both the performance of public prosecutors’ duties and personnel management. From 1935 to 1960, the law had guaranteed the autonomy of its most important function in criminal justice although in personnel management public prosecutors were still under the powers of the Minister. In 1960, the law instituted “the Public Prosecutor Service Commission” to ensure autonomy of public prosecution in the area of personnel administration. The Public Prosecutor Service Commission comprising of 11 members, was headed by the Minister of Interior. But in 1991, the Minister of Interior was replaced by a retired public prosecutor elected by all public prosecutors. This is due to the fact that the public prosecution ceased to be a department in Minister of Interior to be a department in Minister of Interior to be a full independent body under the tutelage power of the Prime Minister. The Structure and composition of the commission was heavily criticized for its lack of accountability. The study proposed therefore 3 alternatives which would create accountability to be adopted : 1. The present structed of the PPSC is still the same but the Prime Minister who is responsible for the budget of the office of the Attorney General is empowered to veto the resolution of the PPSC on personnel administration ; or 2. It should be added to the present composition of PPSC two more qualified outsiders elected by all public prosecutors as members of the Commission. This should be coupled with empowering the Prime Minister to veto the resolution adopted by the Commission 3. The president of PPSC should be assumed by the Prime Minister himself instead of an elected retired public prosecutor.
