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344       ECONOMIC  INQUIRIES  AND  STUDIES

                  from  the interruption of its commerce, which would b r
                  our ruin.  But our position in this respect is apparently
                  not quite  exceptional.  Less  or more  our  continental
                  neighbours, and  especially  Germany, are  in  the same
                  boat  In the  event of war, if they could  not  make up
                  the loss by traffic  over their land frontiers,  they would
                  be just as liable to suffer from blockade and interrupted
                  commerce as we are.  I t is conceivable, moreover, that
                  in certain wars some of the countries might not be able
                  to  make  up  by  traffic  over  their  land  frontiers  for
                  blockade or interruption of commerce by sea.  We may
                  apprehend, for  instance,  that Germany, if it  were vic-
                  torious by sea in a war with France, would insist upon
                   Belgium and Holland on one side, and Italy and Spain
                  on  the  other  side,  not  ~upplying by  land to  France
                  what had been  cut off by sea.  One or  more  of these
                  countries might  be  allies with Germany from  the first.
                  Contrariwise France and  Russia,  if at  war  with Ger-
                  many and the Triple Alliance, might practically seal up
                  Germany if they were  successful at  sea, insisting  that
                  the  Scandinavian  countries  and  Holland  should  not
                  make up to Germany by land what had been cut off by
                  sea.  Germany in  this  view, apart from  any possibility
                  of rupture with this  country, has a case for a powerful
                  fleet.  It is not quite  so  much  liable  to  a  blockade as
                  we are,  but there is a liability of the same kind.  The
                  question  of naval  preponderance among  rival  powers
                  may thus become rather a  serious  one.  If preponder-
                  -ance is to be nearly as essential to Germany as it is to
                  this country, who  is  to preponderate?  What our prac-
                  tical action  ought to  be  in the premises  is a question
                  that  might easily  lead  us  too far  on  an  occasion like
                  this, but the facts should be ever present to the minds
                  of our public men.  We may be quite certain that they
                  are quite well known and understood in the councils of
                  the  Russian,  German,  French,  and  other  continental
                  governm¢nts.  •
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