Page 266 - clra62_0019-(GIPE)
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258       ECONOMIC  INQUIRIES  AND  STUDIES
                  musJ  either form  part of the  one  Regular  Army  and
                  be trained and disciplined as such, or must be auxiliary
                  forces  such  as  the  Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry
                  now  are,  not so  fully  trained as  the  Regular  soldiers
                  and  only  to  be  called  out  on  emergency,  but  still
                  sufficiently trained to form  part of the fighting line.
                    What should  be  the  numbers  of such  forces?  On
                  this head I should  be  disposed  to  accept the promise
                  of Mr.  'Brodrick  that  he  a.ims  at  about  150,000  of
                  Militia and  Militia  Reserve,  250,000  Volunteers, and
                  50,000 Yeomanry, giving a force  in  all  of  450,000, or
                  say, making deductions  for  recruits and  youths  as  in
                  the case of Regulars,  350,000.  This would give in all
                  an army on full  war strength, not including recruits or
                  men unfit for service, "as follows:
                        Regular Army,  including garrisons   27 0 ,000
                        Regular Army Reserve  .  .  .  .   160,000
                        Auxiliary forces.  .  .  .  .  .  .   35 0 ,000
                                                           780,000

                   Deducting the garrisons at home and abroad the num-
                  bers would  be 620,000, and  would  suffice,  perhaps, to
                  raise  the  army  in  the  field  for  any  specific  purpose
                  from  the figure of 160,000 above stated to one of about
                   400,000, which the numbers in reserve would suffice to
                   replenish for a considerable time.

                     Looking at the matter in detail we cannot say, I  be-
                   lieve,  that the  figures  stated for the Army on a peace
                   and  on a war  footing  are too  high.  The total of the
                   Army  on  a  full  war  footing  is  obviously  somewhat
                   speculative.  As the contingency cannot occur without
                   our having some time and warning to develop  all  the
                   force required, the question has not perhaps the urgency
                   of other Army questions;  but, with  this exception, all
                   the various questions are most urgent indeed,especially
                   the question of the peace  establishment of the Army.
                   The work it may be called on to do is mostly of a kind
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