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ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE SOUTH  AFRICAN  WAR  213
                   and they did not therefore form a  part of the army of
                   labour proportionate to their numbers.
                     There  remains,  however.  the  final  question  under
                   this  head  as to the tendency of the war on account of
                   political and other changes in relation to  the  industry
                  of the  country.  A  large  field  of speculation  is  here
                  opened  up.  I t  is  quite  plain  to  begin  with  that the
                  revelation of the country's want of preparation for any
                  considerable military undeortaking will lead to the very
                  greatest changes in our military and naval departments
                  at home.  The country has been thoroughly  alarmed
                  at the necessity  which  has  been  imposed  upon  us of
                  sending all available troops to a distant field like South
                  Africa, so that no reserve is  left for  any other contin-
                  gency which may befaIJ.  Even greater alarm has been
                  produced by the apparent ignorance  of the art of war
                  in high quarters throughout the British army, and the
                  consequent necessity for improvising everything which
                  is necessary to create an army as distinguished from a
                  mob of armed men.  In particular, the lack of the best
                  provision in the way of weapons  and ammunition and
                  the shortness of supplies  of every kind  have  made  a
                  most painful impression.  It is therefore undoubted that
                  at the end of the war great reforms  must  be  taken in
                  hand;  the  numbers  of  the  regular  army  greatly  in-
                  creased, and everything  done which  has been so long
                  neglected to make the framework of the army complete
                  and efficient, so that operations can  ~e undertaken at
                  any moment without  danger of a  breakdown.  At the
                  same time measures have obviously become necessary
                  to render more  efficient  every kind  of auxiliary force
                  at home, so that in an emergency the country may not
                  be left without a reserve force for a second unfortunate
                  contingency when we are already deeply engaged.  An
                  this means a very considerable  addition to  the outlay
                  for the army and navy in the next few  years of a  more
                  or less permanent kind.  Estimates vary as to what the
                  addition  should be  j  but I am  inclined to think  that a
                  very high estimate will not be  short of the  mark, for
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