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ECONOMIC  ASPECTS  OF  THE SOUTH  AFRICAN WAR,   209
                  serious in its magnitude if measured against the busi-
                  ness of South Africa only, yet because of the magnitude
                  of the United Kingdom and the British Empire, against
                  which the interruption bas really to be measured,  it is
                  hardly sensible.  What it comes to, as far as the United
                  Kingdom is concerned, is  mainly the  stoppage of the
                  labour of the reservists and volunteers who  have been
                  called out and who have left the country for service in
                  South  Africa.  There is  no  industrial  loss, additional
                  to what was going on  in time  of peace,  as  far  as  the
                  services  of those  soldiers who were  with  the  colours
                  when  war broke  out are  concerned.  They are main-
                  tained by the country in time of war just as they were
                  maintained  in  time  of peace.  The case,  however, is
                  different with the reservists and those who have volun-
                  teered,  numbering about  120,000.  They represent  so
                  much labour diverted from  its usual  occupation.  Es-
                  timating the product  of the  labour of  120,000 men as
                  worth on the average to  themselves and  to  the com-
                  munity about  £80 each per annum, we  have a sum of
                  about  £10,000,000 sterling annually lost  to  the  com-
                  munity by the diversion of industry which the war oc-
                  casions.  This is  not all.  It is a fair calculation that for
                  every person actually in the fighting rank, another per-
                  son  in  civil  occupation is  employed in manufacturing
                  implements of war, clothing, saddlery and harness, and
                  other requisites  for  the  field  army;  and  as  our  field
                  army is altogether about 200,000 men, we must assume
                  that  there are  200,000  men  in  civil  employments  in
                  this country practically as much engaged in working for
                  the war as if they were in the field army itself.  In other
                  words, besides the £10,000,000 which we lose through
                  the abstraction  of the people  from  industrial  pursuits
                  to engage in the fighting line itself, we must lose from·
                  £  I 6,000,000 to  £20,000,000 annually by' the  abstrac-
                  tion of people from ordinary civil occupations into the
                  business of making things for  those who are  engaged
                  in the fighting line.
                    This  is  the  economic  loss  of the  war  properly  s()
                     II.                    p
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