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24 8 'ECONOMIC r~JnUEs AhI:- STUDIES
en~:'}ft . .:_'.:'1.1& 'course there is a possibility of raids
by iana as well, as our Indian experience tells us.
I-J;appily, the enemies who may raid us by land at any
point are mostly insignificant, but the possibilities are
not to be altogether overlooked. They reinforce pro
tanto the necessity for strong garrisons at all vulner-
;lble points in time of peace.
The .fourth object for which an army is required
appears to be to repel a posGible invasion at home-
not a mere raid only, but a serious invasion. The
opinion is sometimes expressed, and there is a great
deal of force in it, that we have hardly to concern our-
selves with a serious invasion, as the loss of command
of the sea which would render invasion possible would
mean our complete destruction as a Power, without the
necessity of invasion at all. We should then be liable
to blockade, and a strict blockade would mean our ruin.
After much consideration, I have come to the conclu-
sion that a condition of things might arise in which a
strict blockade would not follow the defeat of our battle
fleets at sea, and invasion might be resorted to instead
by the successful enemy. The reason is that even after
our battle fleets were defeated, supposing that to hap-
pen, the blockade of the English coasts by hostile fleets
would be a tedious and difficult matter, requiring many
ships of a miscellaneous character as well as battleships,
which we could probably make a fight against, with
our natural maritime superiority, for months and even
years, until we were able to challenge once more the
enemy's battleships, It might be the case of our fight-
ing an Armada over again. But, while blockade would
be difficult or impossible for an enemy, it is not incon-
ceivable that if they had overcome our battle fleets they
would be able to command the narrow seas sufficiently
to convoy transports bringing enormous forces for the
invasion of the country. We might thus be brought in
contact on our own soil with the legions of continental
Powers. What operations would be possible for an
enemy in such circumstances need not be discussed in